Adoption of the term intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder, IDD) in DSM-5 represents a shift from a disability (test score) emphasis to a disorder (medical/neurobiological) emphasis. Several implications of this shift for definition and diagnosis of intellectual disability (ID) are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Psychiatrists played a prominent role in the early days of the intellectual disability (ID) [intellectual disability disorder, IDD, formerly mental retardation (MR)] field [1] . However, starting with DSM-III in 1980 [2] and through the publication of DSM-IV-TR in 2000 [3] , the section on mental retardation (now ID/IDD) in psychiatry's guiding classification manual was essentially based on that of another organization, now known as the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities [AAIDD, formerly American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and before that American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)]. The manuals published by AAIDD [upon which the mental retardation (now intellectual disability/IDD) sections in DSM manuals were closely modelled] used a 'disability' (numbers-based) approach more typical of psychology, rather than a 'disorder' (medicalclinical) approach more typical of psychiatry.
The 2013 publication of DSM-5 [4] represents an attempt by psychiatry to provide a more clinically relevant, neuroscience-grounded and medicinesupported 'disorder' emphasis as seen in other DSM categories. Inspiration for this shift was provided by a position paper by the authors of the in-process ICD-11 [5] , which announced an intention to change the name of the category to 'Intellectual Developmental Disorder'. In fact, the intellectual disability/IDD category in DSM-5 has a two-part name: 'Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder)', with the parenthetical second name signalling the move away from a numbers-based disability emphasis.
In part, this shift to a disorder approach is a culmination of various efforts over past decades to broaden the diagnosis to include individuals at the upper range of impaired scores who have been prevented from receiving the diagnosis because of overly rigid reliance on arbitrary intelligence quotient (IQ) cut-off scores [6] . Within the field of cognitive science, full-scale IQ has come to be seen as an outmoded concept, derived from tests that are overly narrow measures mainly of academic ability [7] and based on a 'general' summary index that is a century old [8] . Cross-battery profile methods of cognitive strengths and weaknesses across many tests, including neuropsychological measures, have come to be seen as much more diagnostically relevant than use of a single 'official' test of intelligence, and much more likely to capture the complex individuality of the persons being evaluated [9] . The main argument for continuing to rely so heavily on a single IQ score, or an IQ ceiling, is convention, and the preference that bureaucracies have for a disability-oriented approach that provides number-based and flawed (from a disorder perspective), yet clearly delineated, classes.
THE ARTIFICIALITY OF INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT CUT-OFFS
Intellectual disability/IDD has always been closely tied to the notion of intelligence [10] . The problem is that few intelligence scholars agree as to what intelligence is [11] , there is substantial controversy as to whether full-scale IQ is a sufficient measure of intelligence [12] , and there has been considerable debate and change over the years regarding where to establish the line above which a full-scale IQ score rules out a diagnosis of intellectual disability [13] .
The first modern AAIDD manual was published in 1961 [14] , as a reaction to what were perceived as two inadequacies in the mental retardation (now intellectual disability/IDD) section in DSM-II: it was not based on 'science' (i.e., it did not emphasize IQ cut-offs), and it contained outdated and now offensive terminology (such as 'idiot' and 'imbecile'). The new manual set the ceiling for the category at -1 standard deviation (IQ of 85), which took in the bottom 16% of the population, a ceiling that was perceived as obviously too high (especially if the recently invented second criterion, adaptive behaviour, was to be ignored) [15] . The reason why the bar was set at 85 is because the standard deviation metric for IQ tests is 15, and setting the ceiling at -1 standard deviation gave the impression that the category was based on science rather than bureaucratic policy.
By setting the bar so high in the 1961 AAIDD (then AAMD) manual, the idea was to be overly inclusive and then to use the newly invented second criterion of adaptive behaviour (adaptive functioning in DSM) to winnow the pool down to those who were truly deserving of this diagnosis [16] . In such a scheme, IQ was generally not a bar to ID eligibility, and the second criterion played the most important role in determining who did or did not deserve the ID label. Concerned about the over-identification of ID in minority children and youth (an over-identification that reflected failure of clinicians to use the second criterion), the AAIDD, in its 1973 manual [17] , reduced the ceiling score from 85 to 70. This latter number was, again, based on standard deviation units (-2 standard deviations equals 30 points, subtracted from 100), but the question few asked was 'is it legitimate to use an arbitrary statistical criterion to define a psychiatric category?' This low (second percentile) ceiling was adopted by the American Psychiatric Association, in its paradigm-shifting third edition of DSM in 1980. Reducing the IQ ceiling so drastically mostly solved the false-positives problem, but produced an opposite problem of under-identification. In essence, a system was put in place in which an IQ score below an official ceiling (typically framed as 'approximately two standard deviations below the mean') became a necessary even if not sufficient condition for the diagnosis. In practice, what this means is that clinicians use an IQ test as a screening device, and if the full-scale score is above 70-75 they will either decline to even assess adaptive functioning or they will discount it when concluding a person has intellectual disability, even if there are very
KEY POINTS
When diagnosing intellectual disability/IDD, use a variety of indices of intellectual impairment and do not just rely on a full-scale IQ score.
In approaching the second but related diagnostic prong (adaptive functioning), pay particular attention to behaviours (lack of awareness) that reflect the cognitive nature of the disorder.
Be aware of the fact that people with brain-based developmental disorders typically have mixed cognitive profiles, and one should not expect overall cognitive impairment.
Understanding of the core nature of intellectual disability/IDD is still evolving, but vulnerability due to unawareness of risk seems to lie at the core of the intellectual disability phenotype.
severe deficits in the second criterion, and even when there are clear signs of brain impairment.
VARIOUS EFFORTS TO CORRECT FOR THE PROBLEM OF FALSE NEGATIVES
Within the disability framework for diagnosing intellectual disability, three tactics have been used to create greater flexibility in implementing intellectual disability ceiling scores. These have all been adopted by DSM-5, in addition to a more radical attempt to supplant reliance on full-scale IQ altogether. The first move was to emphasize that all IQ test scores must be interpreted within a reliability range of five points at the 95th confidence interval. This essentially established the upper fullscale IQ ceiling for ID at 75 (the fifth percentile) rather than 70 (the second percentile). DSM-5 continued this practice, by indicating (p. 37) that a ceiling of two standard deviations below the mean can be met with a score as high as 75.
A second source of test error, emphasized both in the recent AAIDD manuals and in DSM-5, has to do with the need to correct for inflated scores due to the use of a test with out-of-date norms. The importance of this issue was first brought to the attention of the intelligence field by James Flynn [18] and it has since become widely accepted and referred to as the 'Flynn effect'. It has been consistently found that the full-scale mean scores on the new tests go down an average of three points per decade of norm obsolescence. In order that a decision based on fullscale IQ not be a lottery based on the accident of which test version was used, it is now standard practice to lower an IQ score by 0.3 points for every year of norm obsolescence [19 & ].
A third recommended course of action, which has been mentioned in recent intellectual disability manuals, is to use something other than full-scale intellectual disability when there is excessive scatter among subscales. For example, in DSM-IV-TR, it was stated that one should consider not using full-scale IQ when there is too big a split between verbal and performance IQ in Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) results (WAIS-III was the last test to use that breakdown; since then, a more differentiated profile is reported). In DSM-5, there is a similar provision, which reads 'highly discrepant individual subtest scores may make an overall IQ score invalid' (p. 37). One wishes this had been worded more precisely, or given some elaboration, as some have interpreted this as meaning that the entire test should be thrown out, even with a full-scale score under the ceiling. Such an interpretation, in our view, is almost certainly mistaken.
In addition to incorporating these three correctives that are found in AAIDD manuals, DSM-5 contains the following statement, which is even more of an assault on the formerly rigid reliance on full-scale IQ scores: 'IQ test scores are approximations of conceptual functioning but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in real life situations and mastery of practical tasks. For example, a person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems in social judgment, social understanding and other areas of adaptive functioning that the person's actual functioning is comparable to those with a lower IQ score. Thus, clinical judgment is needed in interpreting the results of IQ tests' (p. 37). This passage appears to be saying that very low adaptive functioning can cause someone to qualify as intellectual disability in spite of misleadingly high IQ, but the passage is not sufficiently clear because it is framed as an interpretation of IQ rather than an interpretation of intellectual disability (IDD). The point here is that brain impairment creates cognitive complexity which full-scale IQ is not equipped to capture within the context of an intellectual disability evaluation. This explains the suggestion in DSM-5, stated in the next section, to broaden assessment of Criterion A to include, and indeed give greater weight to, comprehensive neuropsychological testing.
CALLS TO USE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES TO SUPPLEMENT OR REPLACE INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT
In the intellectual disability/IDD section in DSM-5, the first criterion -Intellectual Functioning -is described as follows: 'Criterion A refers to intellectual functions that involve reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract thinking, judgment, learning from instruction and experience, and practical understanding' (p. 37). It is a worthwhile and valid list, but few if any of these abilities are tapped directly by intelligence tests or by the full-scale IQ number. In fact, they are more descriptive of the skills tapped by neuropsychological measures of 'executive functions' (brain-based reasoning skills that are involved in understanding and in anticipating future consequences of actions).
The limitations of IQ testing in addressing these skills is reflected in this passage in the DSM-5 section on intellectual disability/IDD: 'Individual cognitive profiles based on neuropsychological testing are more useful for understanding intellectual abilities than a single IQ score' (p. 37). One cannot imagine a clearer statement that, when diagnosing intellectual disability (IDD), profiles are better than single scores, and neuropsychological tests are more comprehensive, and ecologically valid, in capturing the essence of intelligence than are intelligence tests.
A RENEWED FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY/INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY DISORDER AS A DEVELOPMENTAL BRAIN-BASED DISORDER
In the 17th century, Thomas Willis, a British physician who made pioneering contributions to neurology (which he named), anatomy and psychiatry, opined that intellectual disability (IDD) was a disease reflecting problems in brain structure and functioning [20] . In the diagnostic manuals published in the half century leading up to DSM-5, however, one will find little or no mention of the brain in sections pertaining to definition. The intellectual disability/ IDD section of DSM-5 can be considered, at least in part, as an attempt to bring brain development and impairment back as a central feature of the disorder.
A likely reason for this ignoring of the brain can be found in the largely unproductive efforts, during the last quarter of the 20th century, to prevent intellectual disability/IDD through early educational interventions [21] aimed mainly at disadvantaged populations. Related to this was the mistaken assumption put forth by Edward Zigler (who founded Project Head Start, originally intended as a cure for mild intellectual disability/ IDD) and his colleagues that moderate and severe intellectual disability/IDD has organic cause, while mild and borderline mainly has a 'cultural-familial' cause [22] .
A finding of great significance for any discussion of the intellectual disability/IDD section in DSM-5 is that, for many if not most medical syndromes associated with, or causing, intellectual disability/ IDD, the average IQ score is in the mild, not the moderate or severe, range. Thus, any attempt to claim that mild intellectual disability is cultural, and therefore insubstantial, is overly simplistic.
An example of what we are saying can be found in the case of Prader-Willi syndrome (PWS), a rare (one in 10 000-20 000 live births) disorder caused by paternal deletions or maternal uniparental disomy involving chromosome 15, and characterized (among other things) by cognitive impairments, adaptive deficits and a need to eat constantly.
Although PWS is a known cause of intellectual disability/IDD and although the majority of people with it do qualify for a diagnosis of intellectual disability/IDD, a problem is that the IQ distribution in PWS straddles the 70-75 IQ ceiling. This causes a significant minority of affected individuals to be in danger of not getting the benefits of the intellectual disability/IDD label for eligibility of services. A solution that has been adopted in a number of states with active PWS parent advocacy groups has been legislation or regulations that grant intellectual disability/IDD status to people with PWS (which can be reliably diagnosed with clinical and genetic testing) regardless of IQ score. Thus, a law was passed in Connecticut which states that its (now renamed) Department of Developmental Services 'is responsible for the planning, developing, and administering [of] complete, comprehensive, and integrated services for people with mental retardation and people medically diagnosed as having Prader-Willi syndrome' (Connecticut General Statutes §17a-210).
Such an 'intellectual disability equivalency' (or IQ waiver) provision is justifiable, in that there is no discernible difference in the support needs, or severity of adaptive deficits, in individuals with PWS who are above or below the arbitrary 70-75 IQ ceiling. The problem, from a social equity standpoint, however, is that there are many dozens of other brainbased conditions (fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, Dandy-Walker malformation and autism spectrum disorder are three such examples), most of them with higher prevalence rates, which produce severe adaptive deficits and cognitive impairments that cross over the arbitrary 70-75 IQ ceiling. Fairness requires that one should not restrict such a brain disorder waiver of IQ ceilings only to a small number of disorders with the most effective family advocates.
The intellectual disability/IDD section in DSM-5 does not specifically call for special treatment of individuals with brain impairments, but there are provisions (e.g. supplementing neuropsychological measures with IQ in some circumstances, considering a diagnosis of intellectual disability/IDD when adaptive functioning is very low even if IQ is above typical ceilings, not relying on full-scale IQ when there is considerable scatter) that seem particularly relevant to brain-impaired individuals, in whom all three circumstances commonly apply. Furthermore, throughout the intellectual disability section in DSM-5, there is repeated mention of various neurobiological causes of intellectual disability/IDD and essentially no mention of familial causes. For example, a sentence on 'environmental influences' mentions only these biological factors: 'alcohol, other drugs, toxins, teratogens' (p. 39).
Culture is mentioned in DSM-5, but it is mainly in the form of a call to show cultural sensitivity, as in this passage: 'Intellectual Disability occurs in all races and cultures. Cultural sensitivity and knowledge is needed during assessment, taking into account the individual's ethnic, cultural and linguistic background, available experiences, and adaptive functioning within his or her community and cultural setting' (p. 39). Unfortunately, confusion may occur as a result of a second passage which states that deficits and impairments in the first two criteria should be determined 'in comparison to an individual's age-, gender-, and socioculturally matched peers' (p. 37). This passage may risk misinterpretation if socially culturally matched is misinterpreted as 'race norming', using adjusted norms comparing individuals only with their own ethnic and socioeconomic peers, a practice which has been declared illegal by courts and has been discredited by intelligence scholars and test developers. Race norming would have the effect of denying to poor minority individuals -by raising their full-scale IQ scores an average of 15 points -the benefits of the intellectual disability/IDD label, even when there is very obvious evidence of neurobiological cause and real-world evidence of substantial support needs.
One additional indicator of a brain emphasis in DSM-5 is that the third (developmental onset) criterion no longer has a specified ceiling age (set at 16 in AAIDD 1961 and in subsequent AAIDD and DSM manuals at 18) for when onset of impairments must be manifested. An obvious reason for dropping a specific age of onset that is that there is no fundamental difference between a brain-impaired 20-year-old who falls off his motorcycle and a 20-year-old with similar brain impairments caused by meningitis in early childhood. Such elimination or increase in the age ceiling has previously been considered by the AAIDD and DSM committees, but rejected because of concerns expressed by state developmental service agencies about an impact on already-long waiting lists. The centrality of brain development to the construct of intellectual disability/IDD in DSM-5 can be found in the following passage on Criterion C: 'Onset [of ID/IDD] is in the developmental period. The age and characteristic features at onset depend on the etiology and severity of brain dysfunction' (p. 38). In sum, although intellectual disability/IDD is still functionally defined in DSM-5, there is much more emphasis on the brain, and the need to be sensitive to developmentally based brain impairments, than was the case previously.
CALLS TO REFRAME ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING AS DEFICIENT JUDGEMENT
Criterion B ('impairments in everyday adaptive functioning') was introduced by AAIDD in 1961 (using the similar term 'adaptive behaviour'), as a check against over-identification stemming from over-reliance on IQ scores, and a ceiling score (85) that was arbitrarily set way too high. The problem is that the concept was invented in the absence of any clear theory of adaptive behaviour (a term borrowed from the animal literature and referring to how organisms function in the wild) or how it fits with the natural taxon (prototype) of intellectual disability/IDD. Because the second criterion was discussed in a way that lacked any clear connection to the core cognitive deficits in intellectual disability/IDD, it was for a long time ignored, and there were even serious calls for dropping it altogether [23] . Such a proposal (to drop Criterion B) would have made sense if IQ had dropped as well and replaced by a broader model of adaptive intelligence. Such an idea, in fact, was considered at one time, and the current model of adaptive functioning can be considered a distortion of that idea.
In DSM-5, the so-called 'tripartite model' of adaptive functioning that was used in 2002 [24] and 2010 [25] by AAIDD was adopted, along with their requirement for deficits in only one out of three adaptive domains. This replaced the model of Criterion B in DSM-IV-TR, in which deficits in two out of 11 adaptive skills were required. However, unlike the AAIDD manuals, DSM-5 used the term 'adaptive reasoning' (p. 37) to indicate that this criterion should be approached in a manner that erases somewhat the boundary between the first two criteria. This recommendation in DSM-5 -phrased as follows: 'the deficits in adaptive functioning must be directly related to the intellectual impairments described in Criterion A' (p. 38) -has proved to be puzzling to clinicians who approach intellectual disability in a psychometric manner, but makes sense if one understands it as an attempt to better capture the essence of the disorder.
When writing the 1992 AAIDD (then AAMR) manual, the authoring committee initially considered a proposal by the first author [26] to replace the dual criteria model (where adaptive behaviour was seen as a domain independent of intelligence and thus of the ID/IDD taxon) and replace it with a model of multiple intelligences first proposed by EL Thorndike in 1920 [27] . This ideawith three intelligences (conceptual (IQ), social and practical) -was in fact initially accepted (and can be found in the manual's theory section), but at the last minute the committee went in a different direction and took an off-the-shelf community curriculum (actually aimed at people with more severe forms of intellectual disability) with nine skills (later expanded to 10), and required deficits (to keep Criterion B easy and thus noncentral) in only two. DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-IV-TR (2000) used this 1992 AAIDD model, but expanded it to 11 skills when health and safety was split in two (allegedly due to a clerical error). In 2002, and again in 2010, the AAIDD manuals more fully adopted the tripartite model, but as a model of adaptive behaviour (with conceptual, social and practical domains, and with a requirement for deficiency in only one) and not, as originally recommended, as a model of 'adaptive intelligence'. The effect of this, of course, was to keep IQ as the only index of impaired intelligence and allow the second criterion to feature behaviours (such as 'has pleasant breath', an item on one widely-used measure) that, because they are noncognitive, have little or nothing to do with intellectual disability/IDD. A fundamental problem in devising an adequate definition of intellectual disability/IDD is the tendency to think of it as a learning disorder, when in fact it can more accurately be characterized as a thinking or reasoning disorder [28] . The term learning refers to acquisition of discrete behaviours (such as brushing one's teeth) while the term thinking refers to the ability to flexibly deal with problems. The mechanistic mindset that so pervades the intellectual disability field has focused on concrete skills that can be taught using behaviour modification methods.
Undoubtedly, the use of behavioural training methods has contributed to an enhanced ability of many people with intellectual disability/IDD to function better in community settings, but it has not eliminated the fundamental problem faced by people with intellectual disability/IDD, which is an inability to recognize and avoid risk [29] , whether it is physical (burning down the house while cooking) or social (being victimized by a canny predator). By calling for diagnosticians to focus more on cognitively mediated adaptive deficits such as gullibility and risk-unawareness (p. 38), the intellectual disability/IDD section in DSM-5 has taken an important first step towards redefining intellectual disability/IDD as a biologically based disorder marked by limitations in everyday reasoning and judgement, rather than as a purely functional disability marked by seemingly arbitrary ceilings on psychometric measures that generally fail to capture the taxonomic essence of the category.
This more cognitive emphasis in approaching Criterion B can be seen in this description of the social domain as limitations in: 'awareness of others' thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy; interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities, and social judgment' (p. 37), resulting in poor 'accuracy in perceiving peers' social cues [and] limited understanding of risk in social situations; [with a] risk of being manipulated by others (gullibility)' (p. 34). Such a reasoning/ cognitive emphasis is nowhere to be found in existing adaptive functioning measures, and is an indication of the extent to which DSM-5 attempts to ground Criterion B in a natural taxon of brainbased risk-unawareness.
CONCLUSION
The intellectual disability/IDD section in DSM-5 was intended to move away from the excessive reliance on IQ ceilings and to move towards a more scientifically rigorous, humane and comprehensive approach to the disorder. It should be pointed out, however, that the intellectual disability/IDD section in DSM-5 is not a perfect embodiment of a disorder approach, and residues of the formerly dominant disability emphasis (including mention of IQ and IQ cut-offs) can be found. Furthermore, although there is a statement to the effect that neuropsychological profiles are better than IQ scores, there could have been a more fully elaborated discussion of the possibility that someone (especially where there is a brain condition) can qualify for a diagnosis of intellectual disability/ IDD even when scores are above the current ceiling number. Thus, DSM-5 can be seen as a transitional document.
Coming up with an adequate definition of intellectual disability/IDD, as well as of intelligence, has proven over the years to be a challenging task, and more work remains to be done. Although some may look backward nostalgically to the days when the diagnosis of intellectual disability was based mainly on an IQ score and, thus, simple to carry out, the clinical process, not to mention the well being of people who may have intellectual disability/IDD, requires more than that.
